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Abstract: This article argues that the nation is best conceived as a hegemonic project.  It starts 
with a discussion of the dialectical intertwining of the categories of nationhood and 
nationalism, and continues with a treatment of the analytical distinction and historical 
relationship between states and nations.  It sketches the rise of and problems with the 
principle and practice of “self-determination” in the post-Wilsonian world, and seeks to 
problematize still-influential Leninist-cum-Stalinist dogmas regarding the “self-
determination” of nations.  It concludes with an extended consideration of Benedict 
Anderson’s sophisticated neo-Marxist apology for nationalist politics and ideology.  It takes 
Anderson to task on three related counts: for paying insufficient attention to power relations; 
for underestimating the affinities between nationalism and racism; and for denying the 
intimate connection between nationalism and fascism.   
Keywords: nationalism, state-building, nation-building, self-determination, mystification, 
fascism 
 
Introduction 
This article argues that the nation is best conceived as a hegemonic project.  It starts with a 
discussion of the dialectical intertwining of the categories of nationhood and nationalism, and 
continues with a treatment of the analytical distinction and historical relationship between 
states and nations.  It draws on and synthesizes the important work of Juan Linz and Eric 
Hobsbawm, paying particular attention to the processes of state-building and nation-building 
in the European “core” of the emergent world system.  
The article then turns to discuss the rise of and problems with the doctrine and 
practice of “self-determination” in the post-Wilsonian world.  It seeks to problematize still-
influential Leninist-cum-Stalinist dogmas regarding the “self-determination” of nations.  It 
briefly revisits and recovers alternatives to the Leninist position within the classical Marxist 
tradition.  More substantially, it returns to Marx himself.   It focuses on Marx’s early writings, 
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especially “On the Jewish Question,” emphasizing the problematic of “demystification.”  The 
article concludes with an extended consideration of Benedict Anderson’s sophisticated neo-
Marxist apology for nationalist politics and ideology.  It takes Anderson to task on three 
related counts.  First, it chides Anderson for paying insufficient attention to power relations – 
specifically, for ignoring the ways in which all appeals to national community and national 
belonging are embedded within concrete struggles to reproduce or transforming existing 
constellations of power.  Second, it chastises Anderson for underestimating the affinities 
between nationalism and racism in his attempt to decouple the emotions of love and hate, 
not to mention the discourses of destiny and contamination.  Finally, it invokes Benjamin and 
Buck-Morss, in providing grounds for scepticism against Anderson’s attempt to distance 
nationalism from fascism.   
  
Nationhood and Nationalism 
In ontological terms, the “nation” is best conceived as a hegemonic project.1  It exists only 
insofar as people believe it does.  This does not mean that the nation should be equated with 
an ethereal “system of ideas,” nor relegated to the super-structural realm, much less 
diagnosed or dismissed as a form of “false consciousness.”  For to do so would entail 
perpetuating a false binary between materialism and idealism, between base and 
superstructure.2  Like any other idea, the “nation” can only exist as a material force in history, 
“embodied in institutions and apparatuses” – in other words, as “institutionalised form.”3             
Nationalists aspire for their beliefs to be institutionalized, so that such beliefs can be 
diffused, adhered to by an ever broader public, and reproduced.  The process of diffusion and 
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reproduction of nationalist beliefs by state apparatuses has been described in architectural 
terms as that of “nation-building.”4  More recently, Brubaker has described state apparatuses 
engaged in such processes as “nationalizing states.”  He refers to “nationalization” and to 
“nationalizing nationalisms of the existing state” and to “nationalizing elites.”5  Nationhood 
and nationalism are dialectically interrelated.  Gellner has famously insisted that “[i]t is 
nationalism which engenders nations, and not the other way around.”6  It is certainly true 
that nationalists aspire for their beliefs to be institutionalized, so that such beliefs can be 
diffused, adhered to by an ever broader public, and reproduced.  Nevertheless, Gellner’s 
formulation is not quite correct; for nationhood and nationalism cannot be neatly 
distinguished in terms of cause and effect (at least not when these terms are used in a 
unidirectional and undialectical way).  Rather than fixating on questions about which 
determines the other, about which comes first (the “chicken or the egg,” so to speak), it 
makes more sense to understand nationalism and nationhood as two dimensions of the same 
inter-subjective phenomenon, operating simultaneously at different levels of consciousness 
– corresponding with the “programmatic” and the “banal.”7   
Nationalism operates primarily at the conscious level, manifesting itself as “ideology” 
– at its core, a political program that “holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent.”8  Nationhood, by contrast, operates principally at the semi- and even sub-
conscious levels, as a “pervasive system of social classification,” an organising ‘principle of 
vision and division’ of the social world.”9   
The literature on “nation-building” provides the tools for sketching the blueprint of 
institutional arenas targeted by “nationalizing elites,” as well as of the institutional contexts 
within and against which these elites operate.  However, it does not provide much in the way 
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of tools for accounting for how or why particular “nationalizing elites” come to capture state 
power, much less how or why particular nationalizing projects eventually succeed or fail.  In 
other words, it is insufficient for understanding how and why the blueprints of particular 
nationalizing projects come to be “built,” converted into intersubjective common sense, i.e. 
social reality, whilst others are defeated entirely, or at least relegated to the margins.  To 
answer such broader questions about the political dynamics propelling processes of “nation-
building,” recourse to the concept and theory of hegemony is required.10   
The relation between nationhood and nationalism can be usefully compared to Marx’s 
important distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself.  In making this distinction, 
Marx implies an “objective existence to class structure independent of actors’ awareness.”11   
Strictly speaking, such an implication is mistaken.  Like all groups capable of exercising 
collective agency, classes are intersubjective, not objective, realities – at least in the first 
instance.  Moreover, they operate at three, not two, dialectically interrelated levels (or 
“analytical moments”): (1) as cultural rules; (2) as emergent material relations; and (3) as 
situated human behaviour and self-understanding.  
Yet Marx’s dichotomy between class-in-itself and class-for-itself remains nevertheless 
instructive.  For class relations “may exist objectively without actors’ being aware of them” 
(even if it is also true that they can only exist “if actors are doing something of which they are 
aware”).12  In this respect, the ontology of nationhood is fundamentally different from that of 
class – except to the extent that nationhood is effectively fused with the state.13  
 
Nation and State 
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“Nation” and “state” are two categories all too often conflated in common parlance and even 
in scholarly debate.  Yet, as Juan Linz has incisively argued, “state-building and nation-building 
are two overlapping but conceptually and historically different processes.”14  Conceptually, 
following Rokkan, the term “state refers to the sphere of highest governmental authority and 
administration.”  The emergence of the so-called “modern state is synonymous with the 
gradual concentration of administrative functions in the hands of the central government.”  
In the Medieval Kingdoms of Europe, by contrast, “the ruler possessed the highest authority 
but controlled only his own domains.”15  The process of state-building thus refers to the 
encroaching concentration of power, more concretely the shift towards a monopoly of 
administration and coercive force in the hands of the sovereign, in a word, the trend towards 
absolutism.16  Historically, this state-building process can be traced back – at least in the 
European core of the emergent world capitalist system – to the “crisis of feudalism, the 
Rennaissance, and the Reformation,” and more specifically, to “rivalries between emerging 
monarchies in Western and later Northern Europe.”17  
By contrast, the term “nation” has proven notoriously hard to define.  The dominant 
definitional trope today is that a nation is a particular type of “imagined” political community.  
Indeed, according to Benedict Anderson’s highly influential account, the “nation” is a 
community imagined as both sovereign and limited.18  However, this definition remains too 
abstract.  In the concrete world, as Hobsbawm perspicaciously lamented, “no satisfactory 
criterion can be discovered for deciding which of the many human collectivities should be 
labelled in this way.”  To begin with, because there is no objective “way of telling the observer 
how to distinguish a nation from other entities a priori, as we can tell him or her how to 
recognize a bird or to distinguish a mouse from a lizard” (or for that matter an NGO from a 
6 
 
state).19  Consequently, all “objective” definitions of the nation not only “have failed” but are 
bound to fail.  Worse yet, the “subjective” alternative of defining the nation in terms of the 
existence of national consciousness is perhaps more problematic still – open to the objections 
of tautology and extreme voluntarism.20   
Max Weber considered the term nation to belong to the sphere not of “facts” but of 
“values.”  According to Weber, the nation “means above all else that it is proper to expect 
from certain groups a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups.”21  Otherwise 
put, the term nation is never simply descriptive; instead, it entails, at least implicitly, an 
imperative of sacrifice, solidarity and ultimate political loyalty.  Yet, in the sphere of “facts,” 
similar to Hobsbawm, “Weber also notes, there is no agreement on how these groups should 
be delimited or about what concerted action should result from such solidarity.”22  
Whereas the term “state” is both a category of praxis and a category of analysis, the 
term “nation” is best considered a category of praxis alone.  The state “involves a series of 
offices … highly differentiated in modern bureaucracies, armies, courts of justices, 
legislatures, etc.”  The nation does not – “[t]here are no clear rules about membership in a 
nation and there are no defined rights and duties that can be legitimately enforced.”23  This 
is the persuasive core of Brubaker’s call to reframe the study of nationalism so that it 
overcomes the insidious propensity to rely upon and reify the category of the nation. 
As an historical process, state-building preceded the emergence of specifically 
“national” consciousness by several centuries.  For hundreds of years, “state-building went 
on without being based on national sentiment, identity, or consciousness.”  Only in the 
nineteenth century, would the idea of the nation begin to “fire the imagination of the 
intellectuals and the people.”24   
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From early on, “architectonic images” were invoked to describe the state-building 
process.  Indeed, the state was long associated “with the ideas of creation and craft.”  To this 
day, the category “state” continues to connote “artefact,” not “nature,” or “organic birth,” 
the way the category of “nation” does. 
If “states” and “nations” are thus imagined quite differently, this is closely related to 
the relative newness of the “nation.”  When states first began to emerge from the fifteenth 
century, they “did not require intense identification of their subjects with territorial 
boundaries, history, culture, or language.”  In fact, “state identification and loyalty were often 
expected to be transferable merely by virtue of dynastic marriages.  That is, loyalty belonged 
to the dynasty, not to the nation.”25  
The Enlightenment and especially the French Revolution brought with them a 
profound and radical alteration of the terms of political legitimation across much of the 
continent, in turn both reflecting and propelling forward underlying transformations in the 
contours of social-property relations.26  The era of the “nation-state” commenced, and with 
it, sovereignty came to rest – at least in the realm of dominant social imaginaries – no longer 
in “divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynasties,” but instead, in the horizontally-conceived, 
secular and general will of the third estate, i.e. “the nation.”27  In Hobsbawm’s formulation, 
the nation “is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial 
state, the ‘nation-state’, and it is pointless to discuss nation and nationality except insofar as 
both relate to it.”28  
Over the course of the nineteenth century and especially in the early twentieth 
century, the categories of “nation” and “state” would be progressively fused in the core of 
the capitalist world system, as the rulers of many states chose to pursue deliberate “nation-
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building” policies.  The state made the nation, and it did so because it needed to.29  
Accompanying and in order to spur on the radical social transformations wrought by 
industrialization, the state expanded its reach substantially, descending down from 
commanding heights into the “everyday life” of its subjects, “through omnipresent agents, 
from postmen and policemen to teachers and (in many countries) railway employees.”  
Creeping democratization, and the incipient demise of “traditional religion as an effective 
guarantee of social obedience,” rendered it imperative for state authorities to rely upon a 
new “way of welding together the state’s subjects against subversion and dissidence.”  Enter 
the nation: “the new civic religion of states,” a “cement which bonded … citizens to their 
state.”  The more democracy advanced, “the more masses were drawn into politics by 
elections,” and in turn, “the more scope there was for” appeals to the nation “to be heard.”30   
With technological advances, the administration of the state and the economy, both 
public and private, came to require mass literacy, and this in turn triggered the trend of 
linguistic assimilation into a national lingua franca.  Education and conscription were what 
turned “peasants into Frenchmen,” to invoke Eugen Weber’s felicitous turn of phrase.31  But 
such deliberate pursuit of “nation-building” policies rarely proved so successful outside of 
France; for state nationalism “was a double-edged strategy,” and though it proved capable of 
mobilizing some inhabitants, it simultaneously “alienated others – those who did not belong, 
or wish to belong, to the nation identified with the state.”32  
The link Hobsbawm makes between “nationalization” and “democratization” is most 
insightful.  Elsewhere he has famously equated “the age of democratization” with the “era of 
public political hypocrisy.”33  For Hobsbawm, “nationalism” is a classic case of such hypocrisy.  
An ideology capable of manipulating the masses – more often than not – for the benefit of 
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the few.  The First World War, at least as much as the Second, reveal it as a most dangerous 
ideology, a most potent concoction and useful tool for manipulating the masses, a belief 
system that renders them willing to slaughter one another, all for sake of country.   
Education for the purposes of creating a literate and nationalized pool of labor, 
recruitment into war machines capable of mobilizing masses for suicidal sacrifice in total war 
– these are the motives and mechanisms that underpinned and propelled forward the 
“nationalization” of the masses throughout much of Europe.34  “Nationalization” and state-
propagated nationalisms were thus the products of deliberate decisions made by European 
rulers commanding rival ships of state across the tormentuous seas in an era marked by 
creeping democratization, capitalist and Imperialist expansion, and looming Inter-Imperialist 
War.35     
 
The Rise of the Principle of “National Self-Determination” 
The so-called “Great War” was a crucial turning point.  President Wilson famously insisted at 
the peace settlement in 1918 that “[n]ational aspirations must be respected; people may now 
be dominated and governed only by their own consent,” and that “[s]elf-determination is not 
a mere phrase; it is an imperative principle of action.”  Woodrow Wilson, the man who posed 
as the great liberator of the nations, himself a staunch nationalist of an unequivocally 
imperialist, even messianic, bent; an eloquent propagandist of the vision of the United States 
as a chosen people, a new Jerusalem, a city on the hill: “We are chosen and prominently 
chosen to show the way to the nations of the world.”36   
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In the post-Wilsonian world, the doctrine of self-determination is commonly 
conceived as holding that “the political and the national unit should be congruent.”37  
However, when it first burst on to the historical stage at the time of the French Revolution, 
the ideal of self-determination “implied primarily the right of peoples to constitute national 
states in defiance of the dynastic principle, and was a domestic as well as an international 
question. It certainly did not contemplate a wholesale process of secession and 
disintegration."38  The so-called “springtime of the peoples” of 1848, inflected as it was with 
the ideological currents of romanticism, marked a decisive turning point in the history of the 
doctrine, a transformation from a claim about sovereignty residing in “the people, not the 
monarch” into a claim about the right of particular nationalities, increasingly imagined along 
Herderian volk-ish lines, to their own independent states.39  
Indeed, German thinkers like Fichte and Herder developed an idea of the “nation” 
which was originally used “to appeal across the boundaries of existing states to achieve the 
unification of people of the same language and culture.”40  This was the moment of birth of 
nationalism as a political movement in Europe.  At the time of the 1848 revolution, nationalist 
agitation was “strongly linked with liberal and democratic movements” against the 
monarchical states, and nationalist ideology was epitomized by radical democrats “like 
Garibaldi and Mazzini who hoped to combine liberal democratic and republican goals with 
nationalism.” But slowly “nationalism came to take precedence over liberal democratic 
ideas,” and radical democrats like Garibaldi and Mazzini gave way to conservative nation-
builders such as Bismarck and Cavour.41  
It would not be until the end of the First World War, however, that the nationalist 
version of the principle of national self-determination would reach its apogee in legitimating 
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the reconfiguration of state boundaries across the European continent, in accordance with 
the Wilsonian principle.42  It is worth remembering, however, that the attempt to apply this 
principle – that is, the attempt “to make state frontiers coincide with the frontiers of 
nationality and language” – in inter-war Europe proved utterly impractical. Indeed, it proved 
ultimately disastrous, as Hobsbawm rightly insists: 
"Inevitably, given the actual distribution of peoples, most of the new states built on the ruins of 
the Old Empires, were quite as multinational as the old 'prisons of nations' they replaced. 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia are cases in point. German, Slovene, and Croat 
minorities in Italy took the place of Italian minorities in the Habsburg Empire. The main change 
was that states were now on average rather smaller and the 'oppressed peoples' within them were 
now called 'oppressed minorities'.  The logical implication of trying to create a continent neatly 
divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by a separate ethnically and linguistically 
homogenous population, was the mass expulsion or extermination of minorities.  Such was and is 
the murderous reducto ad absurdum of nationalism in its territorial version, although this was not 
fully demonstrated until the 1940s."43  
Nor can the disastrous outcome of the attempt to apply the principle of self-
determination in inter-war Europe be dismissed as a mere contingency or freak mistake.  
Rather, it should be recognized as illustrative of the highly divisive and polarizing populist 
potential of rendering salient rival ethno-nationalist territorial claims in complexly 
intertwined demo-scapes of linguistic and cultural diversity.  The aspirations of rival 
contending ethno-national groups simply cannot be fulfilled simultaneously.  The victories of 
the utopian dreams of some necessarily require the defeats of the dreams of others. 44  
Despite this fundamental problem inherent in the Wilsonian principle of national self-
determination, the doctrine nevertheless remains at the core of current nationalist 
mobilization throughout much of the world.45  However, the appeal of the doctrine cannot be 
attributed to the pernicious legacy of President Wilson alone.  Indeed, Wilson’s beliefs about 
self-determination would surely not be nearly so influential to this day if it were not for their 
paradoxical convergence with the ideas of Vladimir Lenin as well as – in no small part through 
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the influence of the Bolshevik party line – their subsequent salience in the struggles against 
oppression throughout the colonial world.46  
Wilson himself never intended the doctrine to apply to colonial possessions beyond the 
“mature” nations of Europe.  It was Lenin who first made that connection – advocating the 
doctrine of national self-determination in the struggles against Czarist Russia as well as in 
struggles of colonized populations for “national liberation” outside of Europe.  The particular 
tactical judgment behind his advocacy for such a universal principle: the consideration “that 
the liberation of oppressed colonial peoples was an important potential asset for world 
revolution.”47  
It should not be forgotten that “Lenin’s early enthusiasm for the potential revolutionary 
role of nationalism in colonial and non-colonial areas,” reflected in “his fervent advocacy of 
the slogan of national self-determination after 1914,” was highly controversial in Marxist 
circles at the time.48  To begin with, it brought him into direct confrontation with Austro-
Marxists such as Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, who remained committed to balancing the 
struggle against “national oppression” with a clear-cut rejection of territorial appeals for the 
disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian multi-national state along national lines.49  It also 
brought him into sharp conflict with Rosa Luxemburg, who in the course of debates over the 
fate of Poland had attacked the bourgeois principle of self-determination for its “abstract” 
and “utopian” character, dismissing it in no uncertain terms: 
The formula, “the right of nations to self-determination” … gives no practical guidelines for the 
day to day politics of the proletariat, nor any practical solution of nationality problems. For 
example, this formula does not indicate to the Russian proletariat in what way it should demand 
a solution of the Polish national problem, the Finnish question, the Caucasian question, the Jewish, 
etc. ... The duty to resist all forms of national oppression does not include any explanation of what 
conditions and political forms the class-conscious proletariat in Russia at the present time should 
recommend as a solution for the nationality problems of Poland, Latvia, the Jews, etc., or what 
program it should present to match the various programs of the bourgeois, nationalist, and 
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pseudo-socialist parties in the present class struggle. In a word, the formula, “the right of nations 
to self-determination,” is essentially not a political and programmatic guideline in the nationality 
question, but only a means of avoiding that question.”50  
 
Indeed, Lenin’s position on national self-determination was originally sharply contested 
even amongst fellow Bolsheviks who, “like most radical Marxists, rejected appeals to 
nationalism as inappropriate and un-Marxist.”  In this vein, in 1915, Bukharin, Piatokov, and 
Bosh sent documents to the Central Committee attacking Lenin’s slogan of “self-
determination” as “first of all utopian … and harmful as a slogan which disseminates 
illusions.”51  
Lenin’s initially contentious position on self-determination would be elaborated, at his 
behest, by the young Stalin and eventually rendered hegemonic among the Communist left, 
due to its institutionalization in the Soviet Union at the level of Bolshevik party program and 
Constitutional principles, if clearly not always in state practice.52   
 
Returning to Marx and Engels on the National Question 
Marxism-Leninism has thus been complicit in the reification of the nation-form and of 
nationalism as a dominant ideology.  However, the desacralization of Lenin allows in principle 
for a return to origins of sorts within the Marxist tradition, opening up space for questioning 
and re-evaluating old Leninist dogmas.  Among these, the dogma about national self-
determination.53  At first blush, this task may seem difficult, since it has often been alleged 
that the founding fathers of historical materialism had surprisingly little to say about 
nationalism at the level of theory, and that they underestimated the strength of its appeal at 
the level of practice.54  In this vein, Pelczynski complains that “[t]hey had no explanation, for 
instance, of why Polish patriotism in the nineteenth century was so intense and manifested 
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itself in frequent uprisings against foreign powers, although they noted it and praised it often 
in their writings,” before posing the question: “How could Marx, who was such an acute 
observer of contemporary history as well as a social theorist of genius, have been so 
theoretically unconcerned about one of the dominant political phenomena of nineteenth-
century Europe, and apparently blind to its significance for world history?”55    
There is some truth in this accusation.  Marx and Engels did, after all, famously and 
falsely diagnose in their Communist Manifesto – a document drafted in response to the so-
called “springtime of the peoples” of 1848 – that “national differences and antagonisms are 
daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of 
commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the 
conditions of life corresponding thereto.”56  Indeed, they even went so far as to insinuate that 
the dialectical development of the laws of capitalism was leading to an immanent 
transcendence of “national culture” and “national consciousness” and the emergence a world 
culture alongside an international revolutionary class consciousness.  In terms of the 
immanent transcendence of national culture and its replacement with world culture, they 
described/predicted:  
“In place of old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every 
direction, universal inter-dependence of nations, and as in material, so also in intellectual 
production.  The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property.  National 
one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the 
numerous national and local literatures there arises a world literature.”57  
It must be recalled, however, that the Communist Manifesto was a pamphlet drafted in 
a hurry, as a programmatic, even propagandistic, call to action in response to rapidly 
developing revolutionary tumult.  It was thus intended as a direct public intervention in an 
on-going political struggle, in which Marx and Engels were explicitly concerned to steer events 
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– in accordance with a roadmap they drew, a roadmap for worldwide revolutionary rupture, 
expected to erupt in and spread out from the capitalist core.  Given the nature of the 
revolutionary tumult to which they were responding, they were of course well aware of the 
mobilizational power and popular appeal of the category of the “nation,” of its links to 
struggles for the establishment of bourgeois freedoms in bourgeois republics.  Indeed, their 
document makes explicit appeal across national boundaries to all workers of the world.  In 
their call for all workers to unite, justified by their claim that “workers have nothing to lose 
but their chains,” Marx and Engels are deliberately attempting to counter the emergent 
hegemony of the category of “nation.”   They do so by articulating an alternative discourse, 
one that advocates and foresees a more fundamental revolutionary rupture, a transformation 
of social-property relations, to be protagonized by the toilers of humanity themselves, 
destined to unite across national boundaries to struggle against their common lot of misery 
and exploitation.58     
It is not fair to consider Marx and Engels naïve on the national question.59  For starters, 
especially in the longer term, as Eric Hobsbawm not so long ago reminded us, the expansion 
of capitalist social-property relations across the globe has indeed created something 
approximating the “world culture” prophesied in the Manifesto by the founding prophets of 
the faith in communism.60  However, the emergence of this “world culture” has only on rare 
occasions entailed a transcendence of “national” modes of identification, perhaps even 
especially among the working class.  But Marx and Engels then believed the onset of global 
revolution to be immanent; and they believed as well that along with the immanent 
realization of human emancipation would come the transcendence of the national “webs of 
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mystification,” as well as the religious ones, in which the consciousness of the workers 
remained for the time being, unfortunately all too often enmeshed.    
Because Marx and Engels were confident that such national and religious webs of 
mystification were destined to soon be washed away by the rising tide of human 
emancipation and the wave of global communist revolution, they spent little time inquiring 
into the institutional mechanisms of entrenchment and reification of sometimes conflicting, 
always ethno-fetishized and particularistic, national modes of consciousness.  But alas, the 
global revolutionary rupture that Marx and Engels thought was immanent never arrived.  
Instead, the revolutionary tumult of mid-century Europe would soon give way to a quarter 
century of political stability underpinned by unprecedented capitalist expansion, and then 
increasing competition among rival capitalist powers, culminating in an Imperial scramble for 
Africa and ultimately the outbreak of World War.61 
Moreover, when communist revolution finally broke out, nearly seventy years after 
Marx and Engels had declared its arrival immanent, it erupted not in the capitalist core of 
Europe but instead in the Eurasian periphery, when the Bolsheviks seized power in defeated 
Czarist Russia.  The coming to power of revolutionary forces in Russia was immediately hailed 
by many Marxists in the West as harbinger and trigger of immanent world revolution, and 
indeed was theorized as such by the Bolshevik leaders Lenin and Trotsky as well.62  But alas, 
again, the immanent world revolution never came.  The revolution failed to spread from the 
periphery to the capitalist core, and with this failure, the strategy of “socialism in one country” 
was over-determined, as perhaps was even the tragic denouement of Stalinist tyranny that 
ended up extinguishing the emancipatory flame lit in October of 1917.63  
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Though the founding fathers of historical materialism did not spend much time inquiring 
into the mechanisms of entrenchment and reification of national modes of consciousness, it 
is a mistake to claim that they were “theoretically unconcerned” with the phenomenon of 
nationalism.  However, to understand their theoretical posture towards the phenomenon 
requires coming to grips with their critique of “political emancipation” as such.  In this regard, 
it must be recalled that Marx developed his unique approach to social analysis originally as 
an internal critique of liberalism: indeed, Marxism grew out of, was born of, such an exercise 
of ruthless but immanent critique.  In two important early writings from the mid-1840’s, on 
the eve of his decisive break with the categories of liberal philosophy and classical political 
economy, Marx would elaborate a set of weighty theoretical considerations sufficient (1) to 
conclude that the legal and political theories of liberalism were inadequate for understanding 
social reality, and (2) to dismiss the conflation between “political emancipation” and “human 
emancipation” upon which any project of “national liberation” ultimately depends.   
 
The Continuing Relevance of Marx on the Jewish Question 
In a word, by the mid-1840s, Marx had come to believe that socialism would necessarily entail 
“the full emancipation of the individual from the web of mystification which turned 
community life into a world of estrangement presided over by an alienated bureaucracy.”64  
Furthermore, among this “web of mystifications” that needed to be destroyed, Marx had 
surmised, were situated “not only those bonds rising out of class division and exploitation, 
but also religious and national ties.”65  
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In “On the Jewish Question,” Marx confronted head-on a question that is intimately 
related to debates about the “nation” and “national liberation”: that of the extension of the 
franchise in Germany to a minority, a religious-cum-ethnic minority.  The essay takes the form 
of a critique of Bruno Bauer’s analysis of the problem, in which Bauer had urged that the 
franchise be extended to the Jews.  Bauer had advanced a classic liberal argument: the 
problem defined as some group being denied its rights; the solution, an extension of equality.  
In fact, Bauer had gone one step further than this classic liberal argument – he maintained 
that the Jewish question posed the larger problem of the relations between religion and the 
state, both exposing the hypocrisy of the “so-called Christian state” while demanding “that 
the Jew should renounce Judaism, and in general that man should renounce religion, in order 
to be emancipated as a citizen.”66  However, Bauer continued to think the problem could be 
solved from within the existing political institutions.  By contrast, Marx expands the problem 
further, posing a third question, above and beyond the questions, ‘Who should emancipate?’ 
and ‘Who should be emancipated?’.  Marx asks: What kind of emancipation is involved?   
It is at this point where the distinction between “political emancipation” and “human 
emancipation” comes to the foreground.  Marx insists: “To be politically emancipated from 
religion is not to be finally and completely emancipated from religion, because political 
emancipation is not the final and absolute form of human emancipation.”67  He adds that 
“one should have no illusions about the scope of political emancipation,” and proceeds to 
elaborate a sophisticated denunciation of the alienated, bifurcated double-consciousness and 
indeed double-existence that almost inevitably permeates the subjectivities and configures 
the concretely unfree life-circumstances of politically emancipated but actually subjugated 
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citizens.  Indeed, Marx describes the contradiction between formal freedom and actual 
subjugation in nothing short of biblical terms: 
"Where the political state has attained its true development, man – not only in thought, in 
consciousness, but in reality, in life – leads a twofold life, a heavenly and an earthly life: life in the 
political community, in which he considers himself a communal being, and life in civil society, in 
which he acts as a private individual, regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a 
means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers."68  
 
The subject of Marx’s criticism, Bruno Bauer, as a liberal, cannot understand the 
difference between political emancipation and human emancipation.  He cannot see why 
Jews must be emancipated from the kind of society that brings about such an injustice in the 
first place.  Furthermore, Marx points out, not only the Jewish minority but also the Christian 
majority need to be emancipated.  Indeed, Marx insists, human emancipation cannot be 
attained for anyone within a civil society founded upon radical material inequalities.  
Everybody is alienated in “civil society,” and the extension of the suffrage cannot solve such 
problems.69   
Marx here diagnoses a fundamental contradiction at the very core of liberal social 
relations:  the distinction between the public and the private, along with the contradictory 
set of values enshrined for each distinctly-imagined sphere.  As if in passing, he adds that, far 
from being part of the solution, the bourgeois state is actually part of the problem.      
In Marx’s critique of the limits of “political emancipation” there is embedded a critique 
of the category of nation as a mystified, illusory basis for political community.  The unity of 
the nation always fictive, masking and transfiguring the profane power of the few into sacred 
form, even tans-substantiating it into the general will.  Or more evocatively still, the nation as 
sacred vestment in which the profane naked power exercised by the agents of the bourgeois 
state is cloaked.   
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At the same time, and perhaps more centrally, the critique of the limits of “political 
emancipation” entails a critique of the limits of representative democracy.  A critique only 
occasionally recalled by post-Marxists these days, though further elaborated and forcefully 
articulated by Perry Anderson, who has argued in no uncertain terms: 
“Parliament, elected every four or five years as the sovereign expression of popular will, reflects 
the fictive unity of the nation back to the masses as if it were their own self-government. The 
economic divisions within the ‘citizenry’ are masked by the juridical parity between exploiters and 
exploited, and with them the complete separation and non-participation of the masses in the 
work of parliament.”70  
 
Faith in the nation, faith in the bourgeois state, faith in juridical equality, faith in 
representative democracy, all exposed as mystifications and as irrational delusions.  Marx’s 
critique of the category of the nation is thus subsumed under the rubric of a more 
comprehensive critique of mystification.  Belief in “political emancipation,” like belief in other 
ethereal myths and abstractions, equally vulnerable to Marx’s general critique of religious 
consciousness.  In Marx’s own formulation:  
“The members of the political state are religious owing to the dualism between individual life and 
species-life, between the life of civil society and political life. They are religious because men treat 
the political life of the state, an area beyond their real individuality, as if it were their true life. 
They are religious insofar as religion here is the spirit of civil society, expressing the separation and 
remoteness of man from man.”71  
 
If the project of “political emancipation” necessarily entails the consummation of 
alienation and the perpetuation of webs of mystified consciousness, the project of human 
emancipation to which Marx was committed requires precisely the opposite: a thoroughgoing 
process of demystification.  A reverse inversion of the social world.  The myths and fables long 
told to justify and manufacture consent to the looting, the wars, and the lies, mystifications 
which insidiously invade the consciousness of victimizers and victimized alike – these myths 
and fables need to come crashing down, Marx insists.    
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How to precipitate the crash?  By subjecting all dominant worldviews and 
interpretations to “ruthless criticism” – in Marx’s words “ruthless both in the sense of not 
being afraid of the results it arrives at and in the sense of being just as little afraid of conflict 
with the powers that be.”  Ironically enough, given the subsequent conversion of Marxism-
Leninism into one of the great political religions of the twentieth century, Marx himself 
stressed that such a ruthlessly critical posture demanded opposition to “raising any dogmatic 
banner” whatsoever.  According to Marx, the task of critical theory was largely deconstructive 
in spirit.  Its main purpose not the propagation of a new dogma; to the contrary, Marx 
prescribes, “we must try to help the dogmatists to clarify their propositions for 
themselves.”72  
 
 
The Nation as Artefact 
Hegemonic nationalist myths about the “organic” or “natural” ontology of nations 
notwithstanding, most leading scholars of nationalism nevertheless insist that the nation is 
“artefact,” like the state, a work of art, even the result of “conscious efforts by leaders.”73  On 
this point, Hobsbawm concurs with Linz, emphasising the “element of artefact, invention, and 
social engineering which enters into the making of nations.”74  And Gellner concurs with both 
– in denouncing as myth the idea of “nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying men,” 
and in claiming to have uncovered instead the sobering reality that nationalism “sometimes 
takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often 
obliterates pre-existing cultures.”75  Or, even more polemically, when Gellner insists that 
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“[n]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where 
they do not exist.”76 
Anderson has famously objected to this latter formulation of “nation as invention,” on 
the grounds that it connotes “fabrication” and “falsity,” rather than “imagining” and 
“creation,” and thus implies a juxtaposition between “false” and “true” communities.  He is 
certainly right that it does connote and imply such things; but this is hardly grounds for 
dismissing the cogency of the metaphor.  Anderson insists that communities are not to be 
distinguished by their “truth” or “falsity,” since “all communities larger than primordial 
villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined.”77  However, just 
because nearly all communities are “imagined” does not mean that all claims to community 
are equally “true” or compelling.  Claims of community can be distinguished not only by the 
“style” in which they are imagined; they can also be adjudicated among in terms of the 
particular interests and particular agendas advanced in the name of some general will.  
This is the crux of Rosa Luxemburg’s intransigent case against the principle of “national 
self-determination.” For Luxemburg, such a principle seems to presume “uniform social –
political whole” that in any class-divided society can never be presumed, indeed there are 
bound to “exist within each nation classes with antagonistic interests and ‘rights’.”78  The 
point can be made more generally, in a way less constricted by the narrow class bias built into 
classical historical materialism.  In contexts riven by ethno-racialised, gendered, and class 
divides, any appeal to national community and national belonging is bound to be embedded 
within broader struggles to reproduce or transforming existing constellations of power 
relations.   
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Anderson objects to the treatment of nationalism as if it were a mere “ideology,” akin 
to “liberalism” or “fascism.”  He likens it instead to a broad cultural system such as “kinship” 
or “religion.”79  But the attempt to distinguish religion and kinship from mere “ideology” 
suggests a peculiarly narrow concept of the latter, and one that certainly cuts against the 
grain of the well-trodden terrain of not only Marx’s but Freud’s or Nietzsche’s famous 
critiques of religious consciousness as a paradigmatic case of “false consciousness,” not to 
mention feminist critiques of patriarchy and of discursive tropes that reify the gendered 
division of labour through appeals to categories like “family-values.” 
Even if one rejects the idea that all manifestations of religious consciousness can be 
reduced to or dismissed as opiate, fantasy, or outlet for ressentiment, certainly some, perhaps 
even most, modes of religious consciousness are vulnerable on at least one of these counts.80  
What’s more, not only is all religious consciousness certainly ideological when the term is 
used in the broad sense as entailing a comprehensive world view; so too are nearly all 
manifestations of religious consciousness ideological in the narrower sense of being 
ubiquitously marshalled in concrete political struggles to reproduce or transform existing 
constellations of power relations.   
 
The Nation, the Family, and Love 
The other category to which Anderson compares the nation in his attempt to render it beyond 
susceptibility to ideology critique is that of “kinship.”  The attempt to liken nationalism to 
“kinship” is especially problematic because it reifies and reproduces perhaps the 
quintessential nationalist trope or presumption – what David Theo Goldberg has referred to 
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as its “abstract presumption of familialism.”  This presumption of the “familiar,” that “I am 
like them,” and therefore that we must be “familially connected,” of course, ultimately 
implies – “if often silently” – a negation of those branded as nationally or racially other, those 
“differentiated and disconnected.”81  
The “familial” analogy is central to the imagining of national community, which helps 
to explain the oft-observed emotive force of appeals to the nation, as well as the close 
affinities between nationalism and patriarchy.82  Anderson chides critics of “Nationalism with 
a capital N” for focusing too much on all the murders committed in the name of the nation, 
and focusing too little on the effectiveness of appeals to the nation at inducing a willingness 
to sacrifice and even to die for the sake of one’s country. He also insists that critics of 
nationalism too often conflate nationalism with racism, too often try to depict it as motivated 
exclusively by hate, and too infrequently emphasise the links between nationalism and the 
emotion of love.83  
Anderson would pose the question: how can the nation, if it is a community based on 
the emotion of love, be dismissed as an “ideology,” as but a manifestation of false 
consciousness?  Freud remains on this count most instructive, as Sarah Ahmed has reminded. 
“Love makes the subject vulnerable, exposed to, and dependent on another,” and is “linked 
profoundly to the anxiety of boundary formation,” whereby what is not me and what is me 
to some extent even merge.84  Love is perhaps the ultimate form of desire; as such, it is 
ubiquitously infused with projections of ideals. “Desire creates an ideal object.”85  And thus 
the potential for love to bleed into an acute form of false-consciousness, self-destructiveness, 
even self-loathing. As Ahmed insists: “[e]ven though love is a demand for reciprocity, it is also 
an emotion that lives with the failure of that demand often through an intensification of its 
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affect (so, if you do not love me back, I may love you more as the pain of the non-loving is the 
sign of what it means not to have this love.”86  Likewise, witness the frequent invocation of 
love in justifications for staying the course and enduring abusive familial relationships. Like a 
masochistic battered wife who continues to love her husband, to stand by her man despite 
repeated infidelities and transgressions, one can “love the nation out of hope and with 
nostalgia for how it could have been,” one can “keep loving rather than recognizing that the 
love that one has given has not and will not be returned.”87  
What’s more, the connection between the “national idea” and “national ideals” is such 
that perceived failure to live up to or "embody" such "ideals" serves to justify exclusion and 
marginalization. Indeed, the untrustworthy “others” are cast out, as foils, even scapegoated 
for national failings.88 In the face of the failure of the nation to return the love, i.e. to deliver 
on the emancipatory promises so frequently associated with it, “defensive narratives” can 
quickly surface. All too easily, the “failure of return is ‘explained’ by the presence of others,” 
the ungrateful, the unpatriotic, those who do not belong. Thus the ubiquity of lurking 
projected shadows, of racialized “others,” of those symbolically and materially marginalized 
and excluded, of the “wretched,” of those who serve to fix the boundaries of the body politic, 
of those imagined to intrude like a virus.89 Those from other countries; those without country. 
No imagined self without imagined others.  The discourses of destiny and contamination, it 
turns out, cannot be so easily decoupled. 
Ultimately, love and grief are inextricably intertwined.  A human who one loves is a 
human whose death will be grieved, whose death is worth grieving.  And so, in the ideology 
of national belonging, as Ahmed – following Butler – points out, co-nationals’ lives are 
elevated and imagined as “grievable;” and ritualized expressions of national grief in the wake 
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of the death of “co-nationals” has the effect of reproducing and inducing the recognition, 
“that could have been me.”90   
Love of nation, like love of family, never takes place in a vacuum.  Instead, as the 
emotional expression of identification and desire, it is always shot through with power 
relations.  More specifically, shot through with intimately intertwined systems of class, ethno-
racialised, and gender domination.  As such, appeals for loyalty to the nation, demands for 
sacrifice in its name, can only be adequately understood, much less evaluated, in context – 
that is, by illuminating how such appeals are “incorporated,” and how they affect the balance 
of concrete forces engaged in concrete and overlapping political struggles to reproduce 
and/or transform existing constellations of material and social power relations.  
 
The Nation and Ideology Critique 
Anderson is perhaps correct to insist – contra Luxemburg – that national consciousness is not 
necessarily an impediment to emancipatory political goals, nor an alternative to class 
consciousness, nor necessarily reducible to “false consciousness.”91  But he is wrong to 
suggest that nationalist movements cannot be adequately understood through an 
interpretive lens emphasizing the specifically “ideological” dimension of the phenomenon, in 
the narrow sense; that is, through an analytic of ideology critique.92    
Anderson is right to insist as well that the categories and preconditions of “national 
consciousness” are deeply rooted in the structure of contemporary society, including 
technologies of social communication and basic features of capitalist as well as state-socialist 
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social-property relations.  No doubt, one of the great virtues of Anderson’s book is the 
breadth and complexity of the causal account he provides.   
Indeed, Anderson compellingly links the emergence of “national consciousness” to 
broader conditions of epistemic possibility – including crucially the rise of the scientific 
worldview in Europe, the process of secularisation, and the consubstantial emergent 
dominant conception of time as “homogenous and empty,” all mediated through the 
machinations of print capitalism.93   
The notion of “homogenous, empty time” comes from Walter Benjamin, upon whom 
Anderson’s causal account relies significantly.  In this respect, it is more than a little ironic that 
he attempts to divorce “nationalism” from “fascism,” by elevating the former to the status of 
“cultural system,” while demoting the latter to the level of mere ideology, alongside the likes 
of liberalism.  For Benjamin offered a prescient and piercing early diagnosis of “mass society,” 
and even “the society of the spectacle”- a condition (a) underpinned and propelled forward 
by transformations in art and in the “mass media” in the age of mechanical reproduction; and 
(b) intimately intertwined with the rise of fascism.  
According to Benjamin, fascism is best understood as “an attempt to organize the 
newly created proletarian masses without affecting the property structure,” promising them 
salvation not by giving the masses “their right,” their due, but instead merely giving them “a 
chance to express themselves, resulting in the “introduction of aesthetics into political life.”  
Benjamin hones in especially on the significance of the Futurists’ glamorization and 
glorification of the alleged beauty of war, adducing it as evidence of the extent of human 
“self-alienation” experienced in “mass society.”  In his words: “Mankind’s … self-alienation 
28 
 
has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure 
of the first order.”94 
Benjamin, like Freud, held the modern experience to be centered principally on 
“shock.”  As Buck-Morss has explained: “In industrial production no less than modern warfare, 
in street crowds and erotic encounters, in amusement parks and gambling casinos, shock is 
the very essence of modern experience.”  Under such conditions, “response to stimuli without 
thinking has become necessary for survival.”  Consciousness comes to serve largely as a 
“shield” and a “buffer,” protecting the organism by preventing the retention of external 
stimuli from being “impressed as memory,” even “isolating present consciousness from past 
memory.”  The depth of memory thus flattened, “experience is impoverished.”95  This “crisis 
in cognitive experience” is in turn linked to the cultivation of narcissism, a narcissism which 
“functions as an anaesthetizing tactic against the shock of modern experience,” which is 
“appealed to daily by the image-phantasmagoria of mass culture,” and which renders fertile 
“the ground from which fascism” can spring forth.96 
But Anderson’s attempt to divorce “nationalism” from “fascism” is ultimately 
unconvincing, regardless of one’s views about Benjamin.97  The experience of the first half of 
the twentieth century in Europe cannot be brushed aside so easily, as if a fluke.  Hobsbawm’s 
comparative evidence is compelling.  In the fifty years or so leading up to the outbreak of 
Continental-cum-World War in 1914, all versions of nationalism that “came to the fore” had 
one thing in common: “a rejection of the new proletarian socialist movements, not only 
because they were proletarian, but also because they were, consciously and militantly 
internationalist, or at the very least non-nationalist.”  Indeed, in this crucial prelude to the 
unprecedented level of human destruction of the so-called Great War, mass nationalism 
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competed directly for appeal amidst a host of rival ideologies – “notably, class-based 
socialism” – which, tragically, it vanquished.98 
 
Conclusion 
This article has defended the proposition that the nation is best conceived as a hegemonic 
project.  The nation as category is analytically distinct from the state; even so, it is a category 
with a very definite history, in which it has been inextricably intertwined with the legitimation 
of “modern” and of “modernizing” states, perhaps particularly but certainly not only in 
Europe.99   
The article traces the rise and problems associated with the doctrine of “self-
determination.”  It builds on Hobsbawm’s account of the impractical and ultimately disastrous 
consequences of the attempt to render state frontiers convergent with the frontiers of 
ethnicity and language in Interwar Europe, before turning to advocate a recuperation of more 
critical alternatives to the ossified Leninist-cum-Stalinist dogmas about self-determination 
within the classical Marxist tradition.   
The repertoire of critical reflections on the limits and alternatives to national “self-
determination” from the classical Marxist tradition can of course be amplified much further.  
Most importantly, a host of other relevant and critical voices can be recovered, especially 
voices reflecting the experiences of struggles against colonialism and the challenges faced in 
the post-colonial world.  Voices such as that of Frantz Fanon, who warned early on against 
the “pitfalls of national consciousness;” or that of Julius Nyerere, who insisted upon 
distinguishing between “the task of the nationalist,” which he considered “simply to rouse 
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the people to a confidence in their power to protest,” on the one side, and “the real freedom 
which socialism represents,” on the other, “a very different thing.”100  
Such a task would certainly take us beyond the limits of this article.  Indeed, it would 
require us to transcend the epistemological confines of much of the theoretical and 
comparative scholarship on nationalism in the English language, which remains all-too-
complacently anchored in a Euro-centric outlook and focus.  The historical configuration of 
relations between states and nations no doubt vary in significant ways in and across post-
colonial contexts.101 
In practice, self-determination has rarely resembled anything approximating human 
emancipation.  Instead, the slogans of national belonging and appeals to the general will of 
the national community have served to advance particular interests – indeed, to cover over 
and conceal inequities, injustices, and exclusions within and between the boundaries of the 
imagined body politic.  Thus the urgency of the task of deconstructing the category of the 
nation, of rendering it susceptible to “ruthless criticism,” i.e. to the method and practice of 
ideology critique.  This requires locating the source and delineating the resonance of any and 
all appeals to the nation within concrete struggles to reproduce or transform existing 
constellations of power relations.  Comprehending the ideological efficacy of recourse to 
national community and national ideals does not require downplaying or denying the 
affinities among nationalism, racism, and fascism.  To the contrary, such comprehension 
requires recognition and critical analysis of the intimate connections between the group 
emotions of love and hate, the discourses of destiny and contamination, and the political 
logics of belonging and exclusion. 
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